Apperly and Butterfill’s (2009) hold that there are two cognitive mind-reading systems. System 1(S1) is fast, automatic and inflexible, whereas system 2 (S2) is reflective, flexible and slow. This paper presents and discusses two central assumptions of this theory: the independence of S1 and S2 and the encapsulation of S1. It is argued that findings on longitudinal trajectories in infancy on the false belief test and visual perspective taking undermine the two-system theory in three respects: (1) S1 is not encapsulated, (...) (2) S1 is not entirely automatic processing, and (3) S2 cognitive processes can be fast and efficient. The paper concludes that mindreading operates through different socio-cognitive processes that are gradually and continuously enriched during development, which eliminates the need for a two-system characterization. (shrink)

Apperly and Butterfill's (2009) hold that there are two cognitive mind-reading systems. System 1(S1) is fast, automatic and inflexible, whereas system 2 (S2) is reflective, flexible and slow. This paper presents and discusses two central assumptions of this theory: the independence of S1 and S2 and the encapsulation of S1. It is argued that findings on longitudinal trajectories in infancy on the false belief test and visual perspective taking undermine the two-system theory in three respects: (1) S1 is not encapsulated, (...) (2) S1 is not entirely automatic processing, and (3) S2 cognitive processes can be fast and efficient. The paper concludes that mindreading operates through different socio-cognitive processes that are gradually and continuously enriched during development, which eliminates the need for a two-system characterization. (shrink)

En la discusión de la teoría de la mente hay dos enfoques que han intentado explicar la atribución de estados psicológicos: la teoría-teoría y la teoría de la simulación. El rasgo distintivo de ambos enfoques es que defienden un proceso cognitivo unimodal de explicación de la lectura de mentes, sea de teorización o simulación. En este trabajo se discuten las implicaciones que tienen estos enfoques en la investigación filosófica y empírica, y se defiende la tesis de que la lectura de (...) mentes no es una capacidad unimodal. Se presentan varias de las inconsistencias de la TT y la TS al buscar un acoplamiento con la evidencia empírica en psicología y neurociencia cognitiva, lo que refleja que, en efecto, la atribución de estados mentales no es el resultado de un proceso cognitivo único. Se concluye que son varios los procesos cognitivos, con distinciones de nivel y complejidad funcional encargados del reconocimiento y atribución de estados psicológicos en los demás, lo que exige un enfoque híbrido, integrativo, pluralista y coherente de la lectura de mentes. (shrink)

Uno de los problemas más importantes y controvertidos en la filosofía evolutiva de Peirce ha sido el estudio de los principios sobre los cuales se da la evolución en la vida y el universo. La doctrina del agapasticismo es la base de su visión cosmológica que busca, mediante un principio creador, conectar a los seres vivientes y al universo a través de una fuerza vital, a saber, el amor.En este artículo buscaré presentar la doctrina del agapismo de Peirce en la (...) cual plantea que el amor, la empatía, el altruismo y la compasión son diversas formas en que los seres vivientes y el universo evolucionan en un complejo proceso de interconexión. Se buscará defender que la idea del amor, encarnada en el agapismo Peirciano, opera en la vida social y es la base sobre la cual es posible la convivencia y el sentido de comunidad entre seres humanos, sin la cual no es posible la evolución ni el progreso social. Finalmente, se establecerá que el sentido de empatía y comunidad que se enraíza en la idea agapastica de Peirce se da en un continuo, en donde la educabilidad en el amor es el principio sobre el cual se debe edificar la sociedad, y en este sentido, el trasfondo filosófico no es una teoría lógica de la evolución, sino una que es tanto ética como estética. (shrink)

La discusión en filosofía de la mente del último siglo giró en torno a los dualismos y monismos ontológicos para explicar la consciencia y los conceptos mentales. Uno de los rasgos distintivos de la discusión fue la pregunta por la existencia de una brecha explicativa entre las categorías mentales y físicas, y el reto de explicar la relación causal entre estas. De ahí que el objetivo de este trabajo sea analizar los problemas que no permitieron el avance en la reflexión (...) filosófica sobre la ontología de la consciencia y los conceptos mentales. Para ello, primero, se introduce el problema difícil de la consciencia y las diversas acepciones sobre lo que significa ser consciente; segundo, se analiza críticamente algunas de las tendencias ontológicas dualistas y monistas más emblemáticas de la filosofía; tercero, se presentan varias de las inconsistencias de las teorías ontológicas tradicionales respecto a la comprensión de la consciencia y el lenguaje psicológico, y cuarto, se brindan argumentos a favor de la idea de que muchos de los problemas filosóficos sobre la consciencia y la relación entre la mente y el cuerpo son el resultado de un mal entendimiento de la naturaleza de los conceptos mentales. El artículo concluye que la negación de la experiencia consciente, el lenguaje mental y los dilemas categoriales de la tradición dualista cartesiana deben quedar en el pasado. (shrink)

The Creative Citizenship project was founded to promote critical, ethical, and creative thinking in early childhood, and to recognize and encourage children as social actors and peacebuilders. In concert with the methodology of North American philosopher Matthew Lipman's Philosophy for Children (P4C), Creative Citizenship seeks to promote in children the ability to think critically, ethically, and creatively in and from their own realities, and to exercise multidimensional thinking skills in the various areas of their daily lives. The research documented here (...) adopted a qualitative approach in so far as it sought to inquire about the character of those relationships, particularly among boys and girls, that promote their identity as social agents. As such, it examined training processes and generated theoretical perspectives in the interest of promoting social transformation through the empowerment of multidimensional thinking. The article begins with a review of the concept of Creative Citizenship and ends with that of Peacebuilding. Three theoretical categories have been applied in order to situate the inquiry within the framework of the realities of childhood, and to chart the pedagogical interventions by adults that occurred throughout the implementation of the project. The first focuses on the development of children’s thinking per se, the second on children's capacities for creative problem-solving in social environments, and the third on the concept of peacebuilding as a commitment to practicing philosophical dialogue among children, which is understood as a form of discourse that builds the capacities of citizens to undertake individual and collective actions that allow them, in turn, to create and re-create scenarios of peaceful coexistence. (shrink)

This paper explores food commoning through an ethnographic case study in Catalonia as our primary site while the Norwegian case is juxtaposed as a comparison, two agriculturally and economically different European countries. The ethnography analyses cooperation networks between organic food producers’ and consumers’ involving different nodes of community gardening initiatives, self-employed growers, local farmers and all of them under a unique cooperative integrating a community economy. The result it is a myriad of exchange practices ranging from reciprocity and barter to (...) market exchange without intermediaries through on-line platforms. Along these exchanges different options of currency intervene giving rise to novel social and cooperative relations. Similar initiatives in Norway show less variation and are less experimental regarding forms of payment but share similarities in relation to material articulations, concerns and forms of alternative practice. Although these novel forms do not represent a complete break from the more standardized supply chains, and hence from the oppositions/contradictions of production and consumption, the participants see themselves as contributing to a more general process of de-commodification of food. We explore the extent to which the meaning and moral values are mutually constituted in relation to socioeconomic exchanges and environmental caring that each person experiences based on different forms of cooperation and reciprocity. Food, we suggest, is more than a commodity on the market that we may influence through our role as consumers. It is a significant focal point connecting our lives to those of others that articulates one’s relations to society in a political manner. (shrink)

La noción de interpretación desarrollada en el racionalismo crítico de Karl R. Popper muestra atributos específicos que la distinguen de modo sustancial de la interpretación constitutiva de la experiencia que tanto N. R. Hanson como Th. Kuhn defienden en sus respectivas propuestas. Se muestra que la interpretación del modelo popperiano queda atrapada en una epistemología de corte empirista que la separa de modo radical de toda hermenéutica filosófica. The notion of interpretation developed in the critical rationalism of Karl R. Popper (...) displays specific attributes that substantially distinguish it from the constituent interpretation of experience defended in both N. R. Hanson and T. Kuhn proposals. The article shows that the interpretation of Popper's model is trapped in an empiricist epistemology that radically separates it from all hermeneutic philosophy. (shrink)

Some arguments against David Lewis’s modal realism seek to exploit apparent inconsistencies between it and anthropic reasoning. A recent argument, in particular, seeks to exploit an inconsistency between modal realism and typicality anthropic premises, premises common in the literature on physical multiverses, to the effect that observers who are like human observers in certain respects must be typical in the relevant multiverse. Here I argue that typicality premises are not applicable to the description of Lewis’s metaphysical multiverse, where the proportions (...) of metaphysically possible observers possessing the pertinent properties can be independently established by metaphysical reasoning. However, other kinds of reasonable anthropic premises can be seen to be consistent with and usable within modal realism. (shrink)

Guido Löhr's recent article makes several insightful and productive suggestions about how to proceed with the empirical study of collective action. However, their critique of the conclusions drawn in Gomez-Lavin & Rachar (2022) is undermined by some issues with the interpretation of the debate and paper. This discussion article clears up those issues, presents new findings from experiments developed in response to Löhr's critiques, reflects on the role of experimental research in the development and refinement of philosophical theories, and adds (...) to Löhr's suggestions about the path forward. (shrink)

The ability to recover from official match-play across a single and multiple matches is often considered a key factor in subsequent performance for modern professional basketball. The aims of this study were to: explore the differences in match performances between different match congestion cycles ; and identify the key performance indicators discriminating between winning and losing during different match congestion cycles. The current study indicated that scoring close to or very far away was significantly greater for winning matches separated by (...) 1- and 2-days of rest compared to consecutive matches. Additionally, shooting efficiency, and attaining Defensive Rebounds and Steals, were significant offensive and defensive KPIs that differentiated winning and losing teams. Similarly, opponent quality and match pace were important situational variables that affected match outcome during different match congestion cycles. While match location had an impact on winning following 1- and 2-days of rest, it had no impact for back-to-back matches. The current results will support coaches' offensive, defensive and recovery strategies during various match congestion cycles for a greater probability of winning NBA matches. (shrink)

This paper examines from a historical perspective Tarski's 1936 essay, "On the concept of logical consequence." I focus on two main aims. The primary aim is to show how Tarski's definition of logical consequence satisfies two desiderata he himself sets forth for it: (1) it must declare logically correct certain formalizations of the -rule and (2) it must allow for variation of the individual domain in the test for logical consequence. My arguments provide a refutation of some interpreters of Tarski, (...) and notably John Etchemendy, who have claimed that his definition does not satisfy those desiderata. A secondary aim of the paper is to offer some basic elements for an understanding of Tarski's definition in the historical logico-philosophical context in which it was proposed. Such historical understanding provides useful insights on Tarski's informal ideas on logical consequence and their internal cohesion. (shrink)

BackgroundThis article aims to contribute to a better conceptualization of pain and suffering by providing non-essential and non-naturalistic definitions of both phenomena. Contributions of classical evidence-based medicine, the humanistic turn in medicine, as well as the phenomenology and narrative theories of suffering and pain, together with certain conceptions of the person beyond them are critically discussed with such purpose.MethodsA philosophical methodology is used, based on the review of existent literature on the topic and the argumentation in favor of what are (...) found as better definitions of suffering and pain.ResultsPain can be described in neurological terms but cognitive awareness, interpretation, behavioral dispositions, as well as cultural and educational factors have a decisive influence on pain perception. Suffering is proposed to be defined as an unpleasant or even anguishing experience, severely affecting a person at a psychophysical and existential level. Pain and suffering are considered unpleasant. However, the provided definitions neither include the idea that pain and suffering can attack and even destroy the self nor the idea that they can constructively expand the self; both perspectives can b e equally useful for managing pain and suffering, but they are not defining features of the same. Including the existential dimension in the definition of suffering highlights the relevance of suffering in life and its effect on one’s own attachment to the world. An understanding of pain and suffering life experiences is proposed, meaning that they are considered aspects of a person’s life, and the self is the ever-changing sum of these experiences.ConclusionsThe provided definitions will be useful to the identification of pain and suffering, to the discussion of how to relieve them, and to a better understanding of how they are expressed and experienced. They lay the groundwork for further research in all these areas, with the twofold aim of a) avoiding epistemological mistakes and moral injustices, and b) highlighting the limitations of medicine in the treatment of suffering and pain. (shrink)

Data do not speak for themselves. Data must be narrated—put to work in particular contexts, sunk into narratives that give them shape and meaning, and mobilized as part of broader processes of interpretation and meaning-making. We examine these processes through the lens of ethnographic practice and, in particular, ethnography’s attention to narrative processes. We draw on a particular case in which digital data must be animated and narrated by different groups in order to examine broader questions of how we might (...) come to understand data ethnographically. (shrink)

This paper examines a parallel between Aristotle’s account of phantasia and contemporary psychological models of working memory, a capacity that enables the temporary maintenance and manipulation of information used in many behaviors. These two capacities, though developed within two distinct scientific paradigms, share a common strategy of psychological explanation, Aristotelian Faculty Psychology. This strategy individuates psychological components by their target-domains and functional roles. Working memory and phantasia result from an attempt to individuate the psychological components responsible for flexible thought and (...) are thus implicated in most of our robust cognitive processes, from reading comprehension to problem solving. We then present two novel objections which suggest that these capacities cannot explain our ability to engage in flexible thought. To escape the resultant impasse, we survey alternatives and argue that most promising strategies depend on identifying the behaviors attributed to intelligent thought and action. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to point out that Davidsonian and Fregean theories of quotation do not accommodate certain facts about disquotation. A second aim is to dispel some errors of interpretation in a common Davidsonian reading of Tarski's claims about quotation. This allows a correct exegesis of Tarski's view, which is then seen not to be affected by the arguments usually adduced against the view wrongly attributed to Tarski. Finally, a Tarskian view is proposed of some problems (...) about quotation not addressed by Tarski. (shrink)

This paper examines the question of the extensional correctness of Tarskian definitions of logical truth and logical consequence. I identify a few different informal properties which are necessary for a sentence to be an informal logical truth and look at whether they are necessary properties of Tarskian logical truths. I examine arguments by John Etchemendy and Vann McGee to the effect that some of those properties are not necessary properties of some Tarskian logical truths, and find them unconvincing. I stress (...) the point that since the hypothesis that Tarski's definitions are extensionally correct is deeply entrenched, the burden of proof is still on the shoulders of Tarski's critics, who have not lifted the burden. (shrink)

In current Western societies, increasing numbers of people express their desire to choose when to die. Allowing people to choose the moment of their death is an ethical issue that should be embedded in sound clinical and legal frameworks. In the case of persons with dementia, it raises further ethical questions such as: Does the person have the capacity to make the choice? Is the person being coerced? Who should be involved in the decision? Is the person’s suffering untreatable? The (...) use of Advance Euthanasia Directives (AED) is suggested as a way to deal with end-of-life wishes of persons with dementia. However, in the Netherlands—the only country in which this practice is legal—the experiences of patients, doctors, and relatives have been far from satisfactory.Our paper analyses this complex ethical challenge from a Dignity-Enhancing Care approach, starting from the Dutch experiences with AED as a case. We first consider the lived experiences of the different stakeholders, seeking out a dialogical-interpretative understanding of care. We aim to promote human dignity as a normative standard for end-of-life care practices. Three concrete proposals are then presented in which this approach can be operationalised in order to deal respectfully with the end-of-life choices of persons with dementia. (shrink)

Timothy Williamson’s potentially most important contribution to epistemicism about vagueness lies in his arguments for the basic epistemicist claim that the alleged cut-off points of vague predicates are not knowable. His arguments for this are based on so-called ‘margin for error principles’. This paper argues that these principles fail to provide a good argument for the basic claim. Williamson has offered at least two kinds of margin for error principles applicable to vague predicates. A certain fallacy of equivocation seems to (...) underlie his justification for both kinds of principles. Besides, the margin for error principles of the first kind can be used in the derivation of unacceptable consequences, while the margin for error principles of the second kind can be shown to be compatible with the falsity of epistemicism, under a number of assumptions acceptable to the epistemicist. (shrink)

We propose a semiotic framework to underpin a posthumanist philosophy of education, as contrasted to technological determinism. A recent approach to educational processes as semiotic phenomena lends itself as a philosophy to understand the current interplay between education and technology. This view is aligned with the transhumanist movement to defend techno-scientific progress as fundamental to human development. Particularly, we adopt a semiotic approach to education to tackle certain tensions in current debates on the human. Transhumanism scholars share the optimistic belief (...) that there is no limit to how the ethical use of technology can help alleviate suffering and increase our health and wisdom. From this perspective, it appears possible to acquire capacities that require rethinking the notion of human altogether. For others, this undermining of essentialist concepts of humanity entails serious risks, especially related to ethical egalitarianism. We adopte the perspective of edusemiotics, a framework that brings together semiotics, educational theory and philosophy of education. As a theoretical-practical framework, edusemiotics affords a hermeneutic and semiotic method for our approach. Peirce’s logic of signs is used to analyze socio- educational interactions as environmental. We observe two lines of thought. On the one hand, technological transhumanism enhances Cartesian mind–body dualism. On the other hand, philosophical posthumanism seeks to overcome this dichotomy. The former proposal construes human transformation as an artifactualization derived from techno-scientific enhancements. The latter position proposes an integrative posthumanism, capable not only to include edusemiotic theory but also to rethink the concept of learning as mutual to that of human. (shrink)

I argue that recent defenses of the view that in 1936 Tarski required all interpretations of a language to share one same domain of quantification are based on misinterpretations of Tarski’s texts. In particular, I rebut some criticisms of my earlier attack on the fixed-domain exegesis and I offer a more detailed report of the textual evidence on the issue than in my earlier work. I also offer new considerations on subsisting issues of interpretation concerning Tarski’s views on the logical (...) correctness of certain omega-arguments, on the Tarskian proof that Etchemendy took to be modal and fallacious, and on Tarski’s appeals to the “common concept of consequence”. (shrink)

This paper presents some difficulties for Timothy Williamson's epistemicist view of vagueness and for an argument he gives in its defense. First, I claim that the argument, which uses the notion of an "omniscient speaker", is question-begging. Next, I argue that some presumably true scientific hypotheses, which postulate certain relations between everyday vague predicates and scientific predicates, make the central theses of epistemicism highly implausible. Finally, I show that the "margin for error principles" used by Williamson to explain away the (...) kind of ignorance conjectured by epistemicism lead to new sorites-like arguments with unacceptable conclusions. (shrink)

Integrated approaches in the ethical decision-making (EDM) and practically wise decision-making literature are emerging as alternative perspectives to management theories that conceptualize decision-making in a rationalist and value-free manner. However, more dialogue between both perspectives and qualitative research that applies them is required. In addition, there is a need for empirical analysis on business engagement in the face of grand challenges in developing countries. This paper proposes an integrated practically wise EDM framework to study how Colombian councilors who, in 2013, (...) voted for or against the merger between the Colombian state-owned company UNE and the Swedish multinational Millicom interpret this decision and its public impact. Qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted with a voluntary sample of 18 of 21 councilors. Supporters of the UNE-Millicom merger expressed open-mindedness, seeing the merger as a means to achieve justice. On the contrary, the merger’s opponents expressed circumspection, doubting that Millicom’s intentions really leaned toward justice. We conclude that practical wisdom—embodied by both supporters and detractors—fosters an understanding of EDM beyond what leaders should not do. It also includes a democratic and balanced deliberation on what leaders think they should do to promote the common good. (shrink)

This article explores the relationality between women’s bodies and selfies on NSFW (Not Safe For Work) tumblr blogs. We consider the way selfie practices engage with normative, ageist and sexist assumptions of the wider culture in order to understand how specific ways of looking become possible. Women’s experiences of their bodies change through interactions, sense of community and taking and sharing selfies. This article provides an empirical elaboration on what sexy selfies are and do by analysing interviews, selfies and blog (...) content of nine women in the NSFW self-shooters community on tumblr. For our participants, self-shooting is an engaged, self-affirmative and awareness raising pursuit, where their body, through critically self-aware self-care, emerges as agentic, sexual and distinctly female. Thus, this is a reading of selfies as a practice of freedom. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to examine some passages of Tarski‘s paper ’On the concept of logical consequence’ and to show that some recent readings of those passages are wrong. John Etchemendy has claimed that in those passages Tarski gave an argument purporting to show that the notion of logical consequence defined by him (as opposed to some pretheoretic notion of logical consequence) possesses certain modal properties. Etchemendy further claims that the argument he attributes to Tarski is fallacious. Some (...) of Etchemendy’s critics have granted him that Tarski did give an argument purporting to show that the defined notion possesses certain modal properties ; but they have claimed that Tarski’s argument was not a fallacious one. I will show that both Etchemendy and his critics are wrong; in the relevant passages, Tarski did not offer (nor did he intend to offer) an argument that the defined notion of logical consequence possesses any modal properties. (shrink)

Medical professionals routinely offer prenatal genetic testing services to their expecting patients. In theory, this testing helps expecting parents better prepare for the birth of their child: e.g., if the child will have a disability. In practice, however, such testing often leads to the termination of pregnancies that would produce a child who has a disability. Some bioethicists believe that in light of our society’s history of poor treatment of people who have disabilities, when expecting parents use prenatal testing for (...) selective abortion and when medical professionals promote the use of such testing, they express a disparaging message to and about extant disabled people: e.g., that disabled people’s lives are... (shrink)

Logic is formal in the sense that all arguments of the same form as logically valid arguments are also logically valid and hence truth-preserving. However, it is not known whether all arguments that are valid in the usual model-theoretic sense are truthpreserving. Tarski claimed that it could be proved that all arguments that are valid (in the sense of validity he contemplated in his 1936 paper on logical consequence) are truthpreserving. But he did not offer the proof. The question arises (...) whether the usual modeltheoretic sense of validity and Tarski's 1936 sense are the same. I argue in this paper that they probably are not, and that the proof Tarski had in mind, although unusable to prove that model-theoretically valid arguments are truth-preserving, can be used to prove that arguments valid in Tarski's 1936 sense are truth-preserving. (shrink)

The paper brings into light and discusses a concentric solar model briefly described in Chapter 5 of Section III of ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Khāzinī’s On experimental astronomy, a treatise embedded in the prolegomenon of his comprehensive Mu‘tabar zīj, completed about 1121 c.e. In it, the Sun is assumed to rotate on the circumference of a circle concentric with the Earth and coplanar with the ecliptic, but the motion of the vector joining the Earth and Sun is monitored by a small eccentric (...) hypocycle. The ratio between the distance of the hypocycle’s center from the Earth and the hypocycle’s radius is equal to the solar eccentricity in the eccentric model. The model is to account for the constancy of the apparent diameter of the solar disk as held by Ptolemy. The source of the model is unknown. Since the mechanism employed in it clearly resembles the pin-and-slot device, whose use in mechanical astronomical instruments has a long history from the Antikythera Mechanism to the medieval solar, lunar, and planetary equatoria and dials, we argue that the solar model can be positioned within this long-standing tradition and considered the result of the correct understanding of some Byzantine prototype and thus a typical example of the transmission of astronomical ideas via media of the material culture. (shrink)

Tarski implicitly postulated that a certain pre-theoretical concept of logical consequence and his technical concept of logical consequence are co-extensional. This chapter makes explicit a few theses about logical consequence or logical truth that sound Tarskian somehow, including one that most deserves the name ‘Tarski's Thesis’. Some of these theses are probably true or close to true but weaker than Tarski's. Some are false but stronger than Tarski's. Tarski's Thesis plausibly postulated that a sentence of a classical language possibly extended (...) with non-traditional extensional logical constants is logically true, if it is true in all classical interpretations of all its non-logical constants. But it is noted that this thesis turns out to be false on most conceptions of logical truth, for some sentences of a classical language extended with extensional logical constants are true in all classical interpretations of all its non-logical constants, but are not necessary. (shrink)

Using data from 88 countries, we test hypotheses linking a country’s economic freedom and cultural values with the propensity and timing of decisions to impose stringent policies to combat the spread of Covid-19, as well as society’s compliance with those restrictive measures. Our analysis supports hypotheses that a country’s economic freedom and cultural dimensions of individualism and masculinity predict early implementation of stringent policies. After accounting for endogeneity, we find that individualism also helps explain residents’ compliance with stringent measures. These (...) findings illustrate how institutions and cultural values influence government policies and societal compliance. (shrink)

Contrary to what often seems to be the implicit belief, Tarski's 1933 version of the theorem on the indefinability of truth did not mention semantic notions, either defined or intuitive. I state this version in a somewhat modernized form and explain briefly the self-imposed mathematico-philosophical constraints that led Tarski to formulate it as he did. I also point out that close attention to its content suggests a refined view of the exact contrast between Tarski's achievement and Gödel's achievement in his (...) earlier discovery of another version of the result. (shrink)

Brains enjoy a bodily life. Therefore animals are subjects with a point of view. Yet, coding betrays an anthropomorphic bias: we can, therefore they must. Here I propose a reformulation of Brette's question that emphasizes organismic perception, cautioning for misinterpretations based on external ideal-observer accounts. Theoretical ethology allows computational neuroscience to understand brains from the perspective of their owners.

I postulate that the extension of a degree adjective is fixed by implicitly accepted non-analytic reference-fixing principles (“preconceptions”) that combine appeals to paradigmatic cases with generic principles designed to expand the extension of the adjective beyond the paradigmatic range. In regular occasions of use, the paradigm and generic preconceptions are jointly satisfied and determine the existence of an extension/anti-extension pair dividing the adjective’s comparison class into two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive subclasses. Sorites paradoxical occasions of use are irregular occasions (...) of use in which the paradigm and generic preconceptions are not jointly satisfied. In them, the relevant degree adjective lacks an extension, and utterances of sentences containing it appearing in sorites arguments do not have truth conditions. I also postulate a probable psychology of paradigm intuitions, used in a psychological explanation of the preference for solutions of the sorites paradox on which paradigm preconceptions retain their intuitive truth-values. (shrink)

Recent studies demonstrate a moral self effect: continuity in moral values is crucial to ascriptions of identity in and over time. Since Locke, personal identity has been referred to as a ‘forensic’ concept, meaning that it plays a role in attributions of moral responsibility. If moral values are crucial to identity over time, then perceived changes in a person’s set of values may reduce responsibility for past deeds. To test this, we examined the moral self effect in parole contexts. In (...) this empirical article, we conducted two experiments, in which participants were significantly more likely to grant parole to agents who underwent a moral change as opposed to mere behavioral change. We conclude by discussing possible objections and implications of these philosophical results for the Lockean view of personal identity. -/- . (shrink)

In the first part of this paper, I express doubts that Tarski and Carnap were guilty of some confusions about the relations between truth and meaning, attributed to them by Soames. In the second part, I consider Quine's Carrollian argument against conventionalism about logical truth, discussed only briefly and approvingly by Soames, and I explore the question whether some not obviously incorrect forms of conventionalism about logical truth, such as what I call "finitary conventionalism", are immune to Quine's argument.

Referential uses of quantified determiner phrases other than descriptions have not been extensively considered. In this paper they are considered in some detail, and related to referential uses of descriptions. The first aim is to develop the observation that, contrary to the currently received view that it is only for descriptions that referential uses are frequent and standard, arising in run-of-the-mill contextual scenarios, this is in fact the case for all usual kinds of quantifier phrases. A second aim is to (...) offer a preliminary discussion of how these data about quantifier phrases other than descriptions constrain the feasible extensions of theories of descriptions to cover the referential uses of quantifier phrases in general. I argue that the data don’t support a semantic explanation of referential uses of descriptions, and in fact suggest problems for several semantic theories of referential uses of quantifier phrases in general. I also argue that pragmatic theories of referential uses of quantifier phrases in general might plausibly explain standard referential uses as involving a genus of particularized conversational implicatures in which no conversational maxims are “flouted” or even violated, rather than generalized implicatures or particularized implicatures of Grice’s “exploitative” type. I nevertheless emphasize that I don’t take the dispute between semantic and pragmatic theories of referential use to have been satisfactorily resolved. (shrink)

The pretheoretical notions of logical consequence and of a logical expression are linked in vague and complex ways to modal and pragmatic intuitions. I offer an introduction to the difficulties that these intuitions create when one attempts to give precise characterizations of those notions. Special attention is given to Tarski’s theories of logical consequence and logical constancy. I note that the Tarskian theory of logical consequence has fared better in the face of the difficulties than the Tarskian theory of logical (...) constancy. Other theories of these notions are explained and criticized. (shrink)

Los años treinta y cuarenta vieron surgir en Antioquia un arte americanista y nacionalista, de carácter social, cuyos principales representantes fueron Pedro Nel Gómez, Carlos Correa y Débora Arango. El artículo explora el enfrentamiento conceptual entre los partidarios del muralismo mexicano, fundamentados en la estética marxista, y los partidarios de un arte moderno internacional, opuesto a todo contenido ideológico, liderados en Colombia por la crítica de arte Marta Traba. La discusión será abordada en tres fases: los años de apogeo (...) del arte social (1934-1950), su momento de crisis (1950-1960), y la revisión actual de la historia del arte en Colombia. (shrink)

Roy Sorensen has argued that a certain technical use of quotation marks to name the empty string supports a revised version of Davidson’s theory of quotation. I point out that Sorensen’s considerations provide no support for Davidson’s original theory, and I show that at best they support the revised Davidsonian theory only to the same extent that they support a simpler revised version of a Tarskian theory.

An exposition of Kripke's unpublished critique of dispositionalism about color, followed by a review of some recent defenses of dispositionalism and a sketch of some objections that could be made to these defenses from a broadly Kripkean perspective.

: This response to Nikolaus Knoepffler's paper in the same issue of the Journal agrees that if the arguments supporting the first two of the eight human embryonic stem cell research policy options discussed are unsound, as Knoepffler argues, then it seems natural to move to the increasingly permissive options. If the arguments are sound, however, then the more permissive options should be rejected. It is argued that three of the rejected arguments, taken together, constitute very good reasons to hold (...) that a human embryo is endowed with dignity from fertilization onward. Thus, countries that want their public policies to match the moral imperative of respect for human beings should refrain from allowing destructive human embryo research and should devote considerable energy and public funds to research and clinical trials using non-embryonic ("adult") stem cells. (shrink)

This article examines the little-known sculptures of pathology created by Doctor Paul Richer (1849–1933) in the 1890s for the so-called Musée Charcot at the Hôpital de la Salpêtrière in Paris. Under the direction of Doctor Jean-Martin Charcot (1825–1893), one of the founders of modern neurology, Richer was the head of the hospital's museum of pathological anatomy, as well as the Salpêtrière's resident artist. His ‘series of figural representations of the principal types of nervous pathology’ included busts of patients suffering from (...) labio-glosso-laryngeal paralysis and myopathy, as well as sculptures depicting patients with Parkinson's disease and juvenile hypothyroidism. These patient portraits were seen as objective, while also paradoxically providing an alternative to mechanical media, such as the photograph and the cast, by permitting the doctor's intervention in not only controlling and animating the sitter, but also emphasising the patient's symptoms. This was a new kind of medical specimen: the ‘scientific artwork’, as they were called by a contemporary. This phrase, far from being an oxymoron, indicates the purposive collapse of the objective (‘scientific’) and subjective (‘artistic’) binary in Richer's sculptures of pathology. Through a detailed examination of three of Richer's works, this article problematises the categories traditionally used to describe, analyse and understand medical imagery and complicates our understanding of the relationship between science and art at the end of the nineteenth century. (shrink)

In the summer of 1995, Santiago Castro-Gómez wrote a convincing text entitled Critique of Latin American Reason, and continued Roberto Salazar-Ramos’ work‒who also took part in The Group of Bogotá, responsible for institutionalizing the project of Latin American Philosophy in Colombia‒in order to show how the creation of “The Latin American” was possible through the operation of a series of discourses. Rather than an a priori, the category of “The Latin American” is defined by Castro-Gómez as the effect (...) of a series of discourses to which a specific cultural identity was provided. Consequently, the author uses the tradition of historicism to rethink the history of ideas, so that, instead of studying the reception of European ideas and measuring how close to that scaffolding was Latin American thought, its study should begin from the philosophical and scientific practices themselves as a “part of the critical exercise in Colombia”. It is precisely within this horizon opened by Castro-Gómez’s writings in which this essay is inserted. (shrink)

The scope and role of theological bioethics has become a growing controversial topic. For instance, some bioethicists have adopted a strong stance on the meaning of “Christian bioethics,” as not ex...